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Discussion After the Speeches of Jonathan Fried and Gary
Horlick
QUESTION: Professor King- I appreciate the importance of insti-
tutionalization, the difference being based on an enforcement which is
based on other considerations. We noted that the European Community
had institutional tribunals for hammering out controversies.
In the NAFTA, the group which I was U.S. head of, the ABA-
CBA-Bar Mexicana group, recommended a North American free trade
tribunal. We recommended this for consistency sake, so that the deci-
sions were not isolated. We also looked to the future and felt that per-
haps as other countries adhered to the concept of NAFTA, that there
would be an even greater need for consistencies in ruling so that each
proceeding would not be one, in and of itself.
I would like to have Jon comment on that concept, and also per-
haps elaborate on his feeling that there is not as much a need for insti-
tutionalization in the settlement of disputes, as perhaps others, includ-
ing myself, would often feel.
ANSWER: Mr. Fried: I would like to answer in a couple of ways.
First, I certainly did not mean to suggest any denigration of the impor-
tance of institutions, but rather that to look solely at a community-
based model of supranational, centralized decision-making which need
not be the only avenue to success. Stand back from the agreement, and
look at what it is supposed to do. It is not merely a dispute settlement
agreement. No free trade agreement is merely an agreement to settle
fights. It is in effect a road map for maintaining and managing an on-
going economic relationship. It is not project specific; it is not case
specific.
How will we continue our rule-making on the basis of a shared
objective, a liberalized market? Against that backdrop, the institutions
of the agreement that are probably most important are those of the
politicians and bureaucrats, not those of the panels. And indeed
NAFTA takes the FTA a little further towards harmonized regulatory
affairs by setting up and sustaining several groups in several areas of a
highly specialized nature. We have groups of veterinarians sitting to-
gether, agronomists and so on. And what do they do? They are doing
the same thing that Gary described in regard to airline or aircraft
safety.
In a couple of areas in the NAFTA itself, we specifically mandate
them to do that. For example, again, in the customs area we tell our
rules of origin people, that if they are faced with a conflicting ruling
from one customs administration versus another, the group shall meet
and redraft the regulation to bring it back to a uniform basis. In the
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sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) area, with regard to standards, we
say, "All right, you are free to regulate domestically, but use the inter-
national standard where you can, and the burden of proof in effect
shifts if you do not. If you are not using an agreed basis, the presump-
tion is that the regulation may be trade-restrictive unless you show why
it is necessary to protect your population."
So really I have two points. First, yes, support for institutions is
important, but not necessarily for any particular kind. Secondly, look
at the on-going management of the relationship and not just the
disputes.
The other thing I note in regard to a permanent tribunal, is that as
far as we have been able to discern - and we have only had five gov-
ernment to government disputes that have gone to a panel proceeding
under Chapter 18 of the FTA, the inherently reasoned nature of judi-
cial or quasi-judicial decision making has not deprived ad hoc panels of
the ability to be consistent in their jurisprudence. The nature of reach-
ing decisions based on arguments, briefs and so on, in an adversarial
context is such that if you are going to base your decision on a prior
decision of an equal court, you must to come up with a good reason,
rather than with whim or capriciousness to do so. So I am not sure that
the panel or roster system is that much poorer a cousin to a permanent
tribunal as your question seems to suggest.
Having said all of that, I am not sure the NAFTA parties will
wait until the fifth country to reexamine the panel system, assuming
Chile is the next country to apply for succession. As Gary described the
roster process, an element of the reverse selection from the roster is
that the other countries who are allegedly ganging up are each able to
point to someone on the panel from their country. And in a three coun-
try dispute, where Canada and Mexico target the United States, for
example, the Americans must choose one Canadian and one Mexican.
So we can always say "Oh, there was a Canadian there, it was not a
bunch of foreigners making the decisions."
If you try to maintain that principle that one of your own will be
there, and Chile joins as a co-complainant, you either go to a seven
person roster, which becomes administratively unreasonable, or maybe
you do have to look at a more permanent tribunal at that stage.
COMMENT: Mr. Horlick: In fact, you have not heard the last of
it. A permanent tribunal was not possible in the U.S.-Canada FTA or
NAFTA because the governments, particularly the U.S., will not agree
to it, but some change becomes inevitable if NAFTA adds members.
The EC Court of Justice is permanent. You could not possibly have 13
free-standing, ad hoc panels in the EU; it does not work. We are hav-
ing enough trouble filling the panels in the U.S./Canada FTA and now
NAFTA.
Let me differ somewhat with Jon. I think the institutions do mat-
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ter. I personally think the European Court of Justice is God's gift to
international law professors. Both Jon and I teach occasionally, and
obviously people here teach more. As all of you know, international law
professors are always teased by their students that there is no Hague
jail, or there is no GATT jail, or they do not have an army to enforce
rulings. The European Court of Justice does not have a jail, and it does
not have ECJ marshals, but people have to follow its decisions, and
they do, and it is enforced through the member states, but you rarely
even get to that point. So, the ECJ finally gives us an institution which
we can point out to our students and say, "See, international [i.e., EU
law] law works."
I do not view NAFTA panels the same way. Although I co-au-
thored an article about them, the fact is no one knows what they will
do. I do not think we have even organized one yet. So let us look at
U.S./Canada: the track record is, to be polite, a mixed bag. Chapter 19
has worked surprisingly well. At the risk of going back a bit, when
Clayton Yeutter took over as U.S. Trade Representative in 1985, he
was the one who really pushed the U.S. view on dispute resolution.
Because of his agricultural background, he was very offended by the
EC ability to block GHT panels. So he was much more interested in
dispute resolution than his predecessors had been. He set up a task
force under Jules Katz. I was the trade lawyer on it, and one of the
most interesting aspects was that he brought in some labor people -
not to argue about labor standards or any of that, but just to tell us
how labor contract dispute resolution mechanisms worked. The point
they made was to segregate the small cases, where neither the company
nor the union really cared what the outcome was; what mattered was
that everyone perceived that there was a fair process. In the end of
most labor arbitrations it is not that big a deal whether the worker
wants to stand 7 inches from the machine, but insurance company re-
quires a distance of 6 inches.
The whole point is not to make every dispute a constitutional issue.
The problem with GATT disputes is that everything is taken to the
level of a big fight, no matter how small it is. What Chapter 19 has
been successful at, for the most part, is that small cases get resolved,
and no one much cares as long as it is perceived as fair. The small
cases involve raspberries, replacement parts for paving machines, things
like that. Where Chapter 19 falls apart is the big case, such as Lum-
ber, where the losing party will never accept the result. So, Chapter 19,
I think, reinforces Jon's point.
I do not view Chapter 18 as reinforcing his point though. The
Salmon compliance record is spotty at best. On Lobster, Canada lost, a
wrong decision, done on a national-line vote, so Canada complied for
sound political reasons. On UHT Canada lost, if you care to character-
ize it that way. Was Puerto Rico ordered to do much? Not much, but
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let us chalk that up as a success. CAMI is sort of a success, and Durum
Wheat was a success but the loser will not accept the result.
The more panels you have, the less consistency you will get com-
pared with what you would have with a permanent tribunal. This is no
more inconsistent than is the U.S. Court of International Trade, which
has nine judges who inevitably rule sometimes in opposite directions.
So, it is not worse than the institution it is replacing, but that is not an
argument for using ad hoc panels as the preferred form of dispute reso-
lution among governments.
COMMENT: Mr. Fried: What is interesting to note in regard to
these panel decisions is that they do a little bit more than what courts
do, because by the terms of both the FTA and now NAFTA, these
panels are invited not only to make their ruling, to make a determina-
tion, but to recommend to the parties proposed solutions.
If you look at Salmon and Herring, for example, although it took
a few more months, there was an agreed codified Memorandum of Un-
derstanding between the two governments that flowed from the
decision.
The governments agreed to revisit how the salmon are doing and
how we are doing in five years. Similarly on wheat, in the Wheat Board
case, the question was wheat board pricing. And the end result of that
was that the two governments negotiated an audit process and both
defined a process for auditing acquisition price in a Memorandum of
Understanding. Now mind you, that has not stifled certain politicians,
but nonetheless the matter in dispute in that case, regarding Canadian
compliance with a particular article of the NAFTA, was settled.
One last point. Let us look at NAFTA. First, it is a consensus
roster. Somebody only gets onto a roster in Chapter 20 if he or she is
acceptable to all three countries. Second, if you try to nominate some-
body from off the roster, there is a peremptory veto. Third, you can use
third and fourth country persons as chairs. And finally, the roster is
limited in total to 30 persons. I think that what you will see in future
disputes is an increasingly frequent recourse to the same people. In ef-
fect, thereby, the likelihood is that panels will resemble a fairly perma-
nent tribunal.
COMMENT: Mr. Horlick: Wheat truly is an elevation of form
over substance; it does not involve just a few politicians. You have the
Secretary of Agriculture saying "I do not care what the panel says, we
are going to impose quotas." I do not chalk that up as a "successful"
panel report.
COMMENT: Mr. Fried: I am not sure he would have responded
better to a permanent tribunal.
COMMENT: Mr. Horlick: Possibly, but it is also contradictory to
say you are going to keep using the same people because it is limited to
30, but note that you can go outside the roster. The history of the
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Chapter 19 roster certainly has shown the need to go outside the ros-
ters more often than not on the U.S. side. And so it really becomes
purely a matter of how many panels there are. If there are a significant
number of panels, they will have to go outside the roster, because all of
these people have full-time jobs. But going back to the fundamental
point, one cannot see the kind of political basis in NAFTA that you
have in the ECJ. I do not view them as even close.
Now I do share Jon's view, just to end on a harmonious note, that
if what he says happens, it does provide the basis when you add the
fourth or the fifth NAFTA country, to start doing something perma-
nent. At some point, however, even the U.S. will have to give up on the
ad hoc panels, because they will not work.
QUESTION: Mr. Doh: I am going to ask two questions. One is a
follow-up from Henry's question and Jon's point about institutions, and
that is, I would concede the point that the rules perhaps need to be
perceived and are more important for the institution from a purely le-
gal framework, as far as changing the procedure of the government.
But it seems to me that we in the U.S. - and I am speaking out here
as a sovereignist, not a U.S. government official - may have dug our-
selves into a bind here with a side agreement. That is, we have con-
ceded that we will be creating permanent secretariats. Secretariats are
simply looking at the questions of enforcement of domestic law. But
Gary's point is right on mark. When you create a bureaucracy, and in
the case of the Environmental Commission, Canada I think has designs
for a fairly significant bureaucracy, you start snapping back; you start
giving it resources, publicity, media, etc. . . . While you may not be
fundamentally changing the legal relationships, in a practical matter,
you are. You already are crossing that line, if you will, of commenting
on the overall standard, perhaps promoting harmonization, etc. ...
Now a fun fact which some of you may know is that in addition to
the environment and labor secretaries, we now have a trade secretary
which we have conceded to have for Mexico. Basically, it is a price for
agreeing to the labor and environmental secretaries. Under the FTA we
have the national secretary, which we like just fine, but we are starting
to talk about obsession and we are starting to talk about permanent
institutions such as the trade secretary. It seems that we are heading
down the line of the institutions starting to drive the policy as posted. I
would like to hear from Jon, whether he agrees or disagrees.
The second question relates to the real problems that Gary has
pointed out in terms of our sub-central relations. Again we set ours up
for some real conflicts. I thought Gary described the conflict and the
problem very lucidly, but I am interested in solutions. Now that we
have dug ourselves into this bind, what might we do about it? What
might we learn from the Canadian experience in dealing with the sub-
central obligations?
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ANSWER: Mr. Fried: Just as a matter of historical fact, it is re-
ally at the strong insistence of the United States EPA that the other
countries were cajoled into going along with the secretariat of a differ-
ent kind and size that we talked about. The Canadian interest was sim-
ply to assure that the resources were appropriate for the mandate that
the agreement gave them. I think really that is the point of the secreta-
riat. What is important to note in the side agreements - and this is
not unique to these two agreements - which Professor Bilder men-
tioned, is what you have asked them to do; dispute settlement is an
add-on chapter.
Five years from now, my prediction is that the most significant
consequences of the labor and environment side agreements will be ex-
panded cooperation, technical assistance, joint work in the kind of stan-
dard setting and regulation that Gary talked about, and maybe more
openness in terms of what standards might be adopted according to
regional or international norms.
So in terms of cooperation, in terms of having a technical resource
available, the environment and labor secretariats are not terribly dis-
tinctive, except in a regional context. The Food and Agricultural Or-
ganization in Rome, for example, just to pick one at random, has a
similar technical mandate. Secondly, again not dissimilar to other in-
ternational secretariats and bureaucracies, what we built into the side
agreements is a certain degree of so-called sunshine. And we already
pervasively have sunshine in a human rights context of course, with or
without having signed any particular agreement.
As we know, the Human Rights Commission of the U.N., or vari-
ous treaties in the OAS and European context will call on countries to
account for human rights performance, either in specific cases or on an
on-going basis of performance.
The GATT and the WTO have adopted this system through some-
thing called the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Once every few
years, countries will be called on to report comprehensively on how
their domestic system is doing vis-a-vis their international obligations.
And to the extent public discussion and reporting will enhance respect
for the things in which we believe, which is compliance with environ-
mental and labor norms, I do not see that as a quantum leap from what
governments are already doing with international secretariats in several
other areas.
Regarding the trade secretariat, again, just a point of clarification:
the central secretariat, which will be. headquartered in Mexico, does
not replace the national sections, because they are complementary. In
effect our secretariats, unlike the GATT secretariats, are limited to ad-
ministrative and court registry functions. They will assist panels, they
will keep records, they will keep proceedings going, and they will pay
out those huge sums to the panelists for their dedicated service.
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It is perfectly appropriate to maintain a court registrar in each
capital, which is where cases will be undertaken. This central secreta-
riat, which will be small, will simply add a more archival institutional
memory, more than anything else, rather than overtaking what the na-
tional sections do.
So to that extent certainly, I think, Canadian, American, and to
my knowledge Mexican, negotiators are fully agreed on the limited role
the central secretariat should initially undertake.
ANSWER: Mr. Horlick: I should disclose bias, because most of
my clients are large U.S. or Canadian businesses, and I think their
perspective is worth bearing in mind.
In terms of dispute resolution, I have been involved in a number of
the U.S./Canada FTA panels, and I am reasonably happy with them,
not perfectly. As I said, I think in the end we will have to go to some-
thing more permanent to get more consistency than multiple panels (or
multiple judges can offer). Look at this in terms of how NAFTA devel-
oped. U.S. business certainly is very interested in NAFTA, very sup-
portive of the basic NAFTA agreement, wanting a NAFTA agree-
ment. They then get told, "but you have to swallow the labor and
environmental agreements."
Now I have yet to encounter a client corporation that wanted an
international negotiation of labor standards; quite the contrary. And if
it were a serious prospect that these secretariats are going to start do-
ing what they are likely to start doing, that is a scary prospect for some
businesses. Simply put, the work force in the United States is about
14% unionized. It is more than double that in Canada and Mexico, so
you can immediately see some splits.
On the environmental side, a number of businesses - I think Dow
Chemical organized a coalition for the Rio Summit - are interested in
international environmental standards, since they are applying the
same standards worldwide. But I doubt that is a unanimous view. And
certainly one where the point Jon makes is a very good one. The
thought that you have the EPAs of the three countries sitting down and
doing this is almost as scary to some businesses as the thought of ten
central bankers sitting in Basel, deciding on interest rates. So all per-
spectives, including business and labor and environmental groups, must
be considered.
COMMENT: Mr. Thomas: I would like to just make a comment,
which I think is an important part of Gary's point in that both labor
and environmental agreements provide for a four year review by the
respective counsel. I cannot believe that the day will not arrive very
soon when there will be members of Congress who will say that the
coverage of labor rights under the labor agreement, for example, is in-
sufficient. It has to be broadened.
I agree with much of what Jon has said, but categorically disagree
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with him that the function of these secretariats is going to be mainly in
promoting corroborative activity between states. With the public com-
plaints project, which allows any citizen in North America on the envi-
ronmental issue to complain about a failure to effectively enforce law, I
think we are going to see a plethora of complaints. As organization
states test out the agreement, we are going to see whether or not it
helps them in focusing their lobbying activities connected with interac-
tion with policy. I think it is going to turn out to be a very interesting
process, and the government may not have known what they were get-
ting themselves into.
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